












Title: Implementation of patient autonomy principle under the conditions of 
penitential isolation 
 
Author: Magdalena Sobas 
 
Citation style: Sobas Magdalena. (2017). Implementation of patient 
autonomy principle under the conditions of penitential isolation. “Roczniki 
Administracji i Prawa” (Nr 17 (2017), s. 51-70) 
 






Źródła finansowania publikacji: środki własne Autora
Authors’ Contribution:
(A) Study Design (projekt badania)
(B) Data Collection (zbieranie danych)
(C) Statistical Analysis (analiza statystyczna)
(D) Data Interpretation (interpretacja danych)
(E) Manuscript Preparation (redagowanie opracowania)
(F) Literature Search (badania literaturowe)
Magdalena Sobas1
IMPLEMENTATION OF PATIENT AUTONOMY 
PRINCIPLE UNDER THE CONDITIONS 
OF PENITENTIAL ISOLATION
INTRODUCTION 
Humans, since they are a creature at the highest level of genetic and biological 
development from conception to death, are equipped with a wide range of laws that 
have special protection. The foundation of these laws is the inherent and inalienable 
dignity of the human being, sometimes also referred to as universal and inalienable. 
The concept of dignity has been regulated in international law and also in national 
legislation, and as J. Zajadlo points out, it was even given a higher level of importance 
along all rights and freedoms. The dignity is inextricably linked, as defined in act 38 of 
1  Doktorantka w Katedrze Prawa Cywilnego i Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego WPiA Uniwer-
sytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach, Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich. 
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the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 7 April 19972 to the right to life and, 
consequently, the right to health guaranteed in act 68 of the Constitution. It should 
be emphasized that the fundamental law in act 38 includes an activity-oriented norm 
which covers the legislative action to protect life3 by the legislator, regardless of the 
social position, financial situation, family, or even health status of the subject4. 
The right to health, as a direct correlator of the right to life, is also linked to the 
generally accepted principle of autonomy of the will, including the autonomy of the will 
of a patient. It is a basic rule of current medical ethics and bioethics5, and at the same 
time, the departure from the paternalistic model in medicine of the authoritarian atti-
tude of the medical staff towards the sick person6. Patient’s autonomy is a manifestation 
of his collaborative approach and understanding of the importance of his participation 
in treatment and therapy7. However, the question arises as to how this postulate is im-
plemented in relation to a patient who receives medical treatment under penitentiary 
isolation. Taking the above into account, it is important to consider whether this prin-
ciple is limited, and whether the conditions in which the patient is located leads to his 
discrimination or  reduction in his chances of  recovery or even the salvation of  life, 
keeping in mind the importance of securing his personal freedom and free will.
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF WILL
The principle of autonomy of an individual’s will is a foundation upon which philo-
sophical, legal and ethical theories are based8. It is also inseparably linked to the con-
stitutional principle of human dignity and it might be treated as its extension, particu-
larly with regards to people in a difficult life situation caused by an illness or any other 
health-related issue, especially in a situation when this principle changes into the prin-
ciple of patient’s autonomy. Currently, autonomy is a fundamental rule of modern phi-
losophy and ethics9. In bioethics, it is recognized as a hallmark10, or as a leading idea11.
2  Konstytucja RP z dnia 7 kwietnia 1997 roku (Dz.U. 1997 nr 78, poz. 483). 
3  B. Banaszak, M. Jabłoński, Teza 2 do art. 38, [In:] J. Boć (ed.), Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku, Wrocław 1998, p. 78.
4  P. Kuczma, Prawna ochrona życia, [w:] M. Jabłoński (ed.), Realizacja i ochrona konstytucyjnych wol-
ności i praw jednostki w polskim porządku prawnym, Wrocław 2014, p. 34. 
5  M. Nowacka, Filozoficzne podstawy zasady autonomii pacjenta, „Probl. Hig. Epidemical” 2008, No. 
89 (3), p. 326. 
6  T. Biesaga, Autonomia lekarza i pacjenta a cel medycyny, „Medycyna Praktyczna” 2005, No. 6, p. 20. 
7  Ibidem. 
8  J. Kaczor, Zasada autonomii woli w świetle filozofii liberalnej, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjo-
logiczny” 2002, Rok LXIII, Zeszyt 1 – 2, https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/bitstream/10593/5208/1/01_
Jacek_Kaczor_Zasada%20autonomii%20woli%20w%20%C5%9Bwietle%20filozofii%20liberalnej_1-25.
pdf [access: 18.03.2017]. 
9  G. Hołub, Co skrywa zasada autonomii?, [w:] G. Hołub, P. Duchliński, T. Biesaga (ed.), Od autonomii 
osoby do autonomii pacjenta, Kraków 2013, p. 141. 
10  A.R. Jonsen, The birth of Bioethics, “Oxford University Press”, New York 1998, p. 334. 
11  O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, “Cambrige University Press”, Cambrige 2002, ix.
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1.1. THE AUTONOMY OF WILL IN AMERICAN DOCTRINE 
In 1970s, the United States Congress established the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioural Research12. The work 
of  the Commission resulted in  issuing the Report and Recommendations: Research 
on the Fetus in 1975 as well as The Belmont report: Ethical principles and guidelines for 
the protection of human subjects of research in 197913, so-called The Belmont Report. 
Departure from a traditional concept of dignity is considered to have originated 
in 1979, when autonomy was considered above other ethical values in American theo-
logical and bioethical doctrines, primarily due to practical reasons14. Such an overvalu-
ation was associated with occurring more commonly in everyday life requirements and 
questions related to issues such as the beginning and end of human life, in vitro ferti-
lization, prenatal diagnosis, cloning, stem cells, scientific research or medical experi-
ments15. This matter became extremely important due to the need to develop clear, un-
derstandable and valuable canons necessary for decision-making in the field of medical 
practice, or creating legal solutions dictated by the need to adapt to the development 
of biology, genetics or biotechnology16. The Belmont Report mentioned the pointed 
above to the existence of three basic ethical principles, namely – the principle of respect 
for persons with regard to the informed consent, the principle of beneficence associ-
ated with risk - benefit assessment and the principle of justice related to qualifications 
of  people for research and medical experiments17. However, it  must be  emphasised 
that although the principle of respect for a person was correlated with the obligation 
to provide information and, consequently, obtaining a person’s consent to take a spe-
cific action, it was also intended to protect the dignity of a human person18. This protec-
tion covered not only those able to understand their situation, but also those who were 
not able to  make independent decisions, while emphasising the right of  everybody 
to be provided with an assistance regardless of whether or not this person was capable 
of consciously exercising its autonomy19. Based on those acts, the higher lever protec-
tion covered children, minors and legally incapacitated20. Such a well-thought protec-
12  G. Hołub, Co skrywa zasada…, s. 141. 
13  Ibidem, these Documents were issued by the National Commission of the United States, pointing 
to the principle of respect for the person for her dignity.
14  T. Biesaga, Autonomia a godność osoby [in:] G. Hołub, P. Duchliński, T. Biesaga (ed.), Od autonomii 
osoby…, p. 170.
15  Ibidem. 
16  Ibidem. 
17  T. Beauchamp, The Origins, Goals, and Core Commitments of  the Belmont Report and Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics, [in:] J.K. Walter, E.P. Klein (ed.), The Story of Bioethics. From Seminal Works to Con-
temporary Explorations, Washington 2003, p. 18. 
18  Ibidem. 
19  Ibidem. 
20  M. Therese Lysaught, Respect: Or, How Respect for Persons Became Respect for Autonomy, „Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy” 2004, No. 29, p. 665-680. 
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tion predominantly considered a human as a person, a subject who has certain rights. 
Autonomy was not the principle which identified a human - it was the human who 
was the most essential element, in some way superior. Thus, the principle of autonomy 
is expressed in the idea of primacy of individual and, therefore, the values which char-
acterise it over importance and good of the community or even the state apparatus21. 
The catalogue of three ethical principles was further clarified at a later date22 and 
in its final version it adopted the following norms: the principle of beneficence, the 
principle of autonomy, the principle of harmlessness and the principle of  justice23. 
It  should be emphasized that the principle of respect for a person has been trans-
formed into the one of will’s autonomy, and the norm of beneficence became a basis 
for establishment of the principle of harmlessness24. 
 
1.2. THE ESSENCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF WILL 
The term autonomy comes from Greek words autos – own, nomos – right25 and 
it is an ambiguous concept. 
According to G. Holub, the principle of autonomy of will originates from the so-
called common morality which, the creators of principality T.L. Beauchamps and J.F. 
Childress26, attempted to define and determine. They pointed out that “in the broad-
est and most ordinary sense, common morality includes socially accepted norms 
of human conduct. It recognizes certain types of behaviour as acceptable, while oth-
ers as unacceptable (...). Common morality is a social institution that uses the code 
of  learned standards”27. According to  American bioethics, in  terms of  autonomy 
one may point to  a  sovereignty in  relation to  external coercion and an  obligation 
to  spot a  difference between the independent subject and the independent choice 
made by it28. R.R. Raden and TL Beauchamp emphasise that there is a possibility that 
an individual might be in a situation when, despite its autonomy, he or she is unable 
to make an independent decision leading to sovereign choices, which is often related 
21  J. Kaczor, Zasada autonomii woli w świetle filozofii liberalnej, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjo-
logiczny” 2002, Rok LXIII, Zeszyt 1 – 2, https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/bitstream/10593/5208/1/01_
Jacek_Kaczor_Zasada%20autonomii%20woli%20w%20%C5%9Bwietle%20filozofii%20liberalnej_1-25.
pdf [access: 18.03.2017].
22  It was made by two americans – Tom Beauchamp and James Childress. They are known for being a cre-
ators of so – called principium (T.L. Beauchamp, J.F. Childress, Zasady etyki medycznej, Warszawa 1996). 
23  G. Hołub, Co skrywa zasada…, p. 142.
24  B. Gert, Ch.M. Culver, K.D. Clouser, Bioethics: A return to Fundamentals, “Oxford University Press”, 
New York 1997, p. 74. 
25  M. Machinek, Autonomia jako wartosc i  problem moralny w  relacji lekarz – pacjent, http://www.
mp.pl/etyka/podstawy_etyki_lekarskiej/57229,autonomia-jako-wartosc-iproblem-moralny-wrelacji-
lekarzpacjent [access: 17.03.2017]. 
26  G. Hołub, Co skrywa zasada…, s. 142.
27  T.L. Beauchamp, J.F. Childress, Zasady etyki…, p. 14. 
28  Ibidem, p. 131. 
MAGDALENA SOBAS, IMPLEMENTATION OF PATIENT AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE... 55
to some external factors such as coercion or lack of knowledge29. The essential ele-
ment of autonomy is rationality, which in some cases becomes a basic component 
that allows to classify certain decisions or actions of a human as independent, or not. 
Autonomy is sometimes perceived as a subcategory of freedom, since not every man-
ifestation of freedom is an independent act30.
Lack of unambiguity within the understanding of the principle of autonomy al-
lows for many interpretations of this notion. It may be understood as a kind of in-
dependence of  act demonstrated in  voluntariness and intentionality31. Autonomy 
may also be acknowledged as act in accordance with general principles and values 
followed by  an individual, his or  her predispositions, personality, or  idea of  life32. 
Autonomy might also be presented in the form of the so-called effective reflection 
based on the need of making decision after prior consideration of its various possible 
effects and their evaluation33. This principle can also be understood as a behaviour 
that is a result of a moral statement based on making decisions and acting in accord-
ance with accepted and followed moral principles34. 
A particularly important issue in regards to the principle of autonomy, is related 
to it respect, in its fundamental meaning expressed in respecting another individual 
and not interfering in its autonomy35. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
broader scope of respect covers activities that do not fall within the scope of the sov-
ereignty of another person by guaranteeing and supporting capability of an individual 
to make decisions independently and, therefore, providing assistance in order to over-
come fears and all other barriers hindering, overcoming and questioning autonomy36. 
According to A. Ryan, the most far-reaching implications related to autonomy 
may be found in liberal theories emphasizing the fundamental importance of a hu-
man who has an ability to make independent, sovereign decisions, power over self 
and own property37. The principle of liberal autonomy and its respect has its founda-
tion in the science and philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Stuart Mill.
Kant as one of the first philosophers formulated the notion of autonomy in a par-
ticularly broad significance and characteristics known to modern times. He interpret-
ed autonomy as an attribute of will guided by the principle of obedience to practical 
29  R.R. Raden, T.L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, “Oxford University Press”, 
New York 1986, p. 8. 
30  R. Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics, John Wiley & Sons, Chichister 1986, p. 61. 
31  B.L. Miller, Autonomia a odmowa poddania się leczeniu ratującemu życie, [in:] W. Galewicz (ed.),Wo-
kół śmierci i umierania, Kraków 2009, p. 117-121. 
32  Ibidem, p. 117.
33  Ibidem, p. 119. 
34  Ibidem, p. 120.
35  R. Gillon, Philosophical…, p. 62. 
36  T.L. Beauchamps, J.F. Childress, Zasady…, p. 136. 
37  A. Ryan, Liberalizm, [w:] R.E. Godin, P. Pettit (ed.), Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej, 
Warszawa 1998, p. 395. 
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dispositions38. Kant’s autonomy is one of the qualities of human will and, therefore, 
it is possible to associate it with a legal nature39. Kant idicated a close link between 
autonomy and human liberty. He emphasized that there is no hierarchical value more 
important than a subject – a human who is a creator of autonomy40. He completely 
rejected the possibility of using coercion to convince the subject to accomplish goals 
or any values that he is not the creator of41. He believed that such coercion would lead 
to the objectification of a human being, at the same time criticizing the idea of pa-
ternalism42. Kant derived the principle of autonomy from human dignity, and con-
sidered the law as a guarantor of both autonomy as well as dignity and liberty of an 
individual43. In this context, it would be inaccurate to omit Kant’s second moral im-
perative, which commands that both an individual and another human being never 
become merely an objective, but are always a goal in and of itself 44. 
The autonomy of  individual and associated with it  independence were related 
to considerations regarding the definition of their scope, as well as, the answer to the 
question of whether there is any possibility of their identification. Debates regard-
ing the freedom of act of an individual and his or her independence with respect 
to the state authority and any other entity were made. A particularly important point 
in this context are the observations of John Stuart Mill, who formulated the princi-
ple of harm based on the assumption that any influence on decisions made by adult 
and reasonable person is prohibited, and human behaviour affects his own future, 
interests and might also affect the interests of other people but only on the condition 
that they agree to it45. The philosopher emphasized that the scope of freedom of an 
individual is clearly defined and that it is defined by the freedom of another human 
being46. He pointed out that people who require assistance and care from others (peo-
ple who are “underage”) should be protected from their own undertaken acts as well 
as from external injuries47. 
However, the fact that the principle of autonomy is inextricably linked to a per-
son, which seems to be obvious, should not be overlooked. Definition of a person was 
made by John Locke, among others, who stated that it is a human who is perceived 
38  I. Kant, Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności, Warszawa 1953, p. 78. 
39  Ibidem. 
40  J. Kaczor, Zasada autonomii woli w świetle filozofii liberalnej, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjolo-
giczny” 2002, Rok LXIII, Zeszyt 1-2, p. 7, https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/bitstream/10593/5208/1/01_
Jacek_Kaczor_Zasada%20autonomii%20woli%20w%20%C5%9Bwietle%20filozofii%20liberalnej_1-25.
pdf [access: 18.03.2017].
41  Ibidem. 
42  Ibidem. 
43  Ibidem. 
44  I. Kant, Uzasadnienie…, p. 62. 
45  J.S. Mill, O wolności, [w:] Utylitaryzm. O wolności, Warszawa 2005, p. 225. 
46  Ibidem, p. 102. 
47  Ibidem, p. 130. 
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as a self-conscious being that is a subject of its own intellectual acts48. On the other 
hand, the autonomy of individual is defined by Locke as a comprehensive, full and 
inseparable right of ownership with regards to himself or herself, and being a compo-
nent of natural law it is not possible to transfer it to another entity49. 
1.3. FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY 
Based on the Polish legal system, autonomy is primarily derived from the fun-
damental principle of dignity, as well as  from act 31 of the Constitution, in which 
the principle of liberty, bodily inviolability and personal freedom of each person was 
determined accordingly. Those principles are the protection measures in case there 
is a risk of attack on legally protected goods50. However, the question arises – what 
is the difference between the liberty defined in act 31 and the personal liberty defined 
in act 41 of the Constitution? 
As stated by W. Skrzydlo, human liberty may be considered in different contexts, 
but above all it is considered in the context of act 41 of the Constitution, which guar-
antees the bodily inviolability and personal freedom of a human being and, thus, the 
possibility of personal limitations only in strictly defined cases on the social basis51. 
The obligation of defining limitations by referring to the Act provides another guar-
antee in the form of possible reduction of personal freedom’s scope while eliminating 
any voluntariness in this sphere, in particular so that a public authority and executive 
organs always act on the basis of delegation of legislative power52. 
In the doctrine, it is also debated that freedom defined in the art. 31 should not 
be identified with personal liberty and, thus, it should be defined as one of the foun-
dations on which the set of human rights and liberties is defined in the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland and, hence, the other rights and freedoms only develop and 
improve the principle of at 3153. 
Alternative way to answer the above question is to point out that there is a pos-
sibility of  distinguishing personal liberty defined in  the act 41  and, consequently, 
the coexistence of it besides liberty defined in the act 3154. The argument supporting 
this thesis may be primarily associated with the situation in which a person is de-
prived of  liberty. Specifically, the person might benefit from his guaranteed liberty 
48  J. Locke, Rozważania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego, t. I, Warszawa 1955, p. 471. 
49  M. Nowacka, Filozoficzne podstawy zasady autonomii pacjenta, „Probl. Hig. Epidemiol” 2008, No. 
89 (3), p. 328-329.
50  Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 11 czerwca 2002 roku, sygn. SK 5/02. 
51  W. Skrzydło, Komentarz do art. 41 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, [in:] W. Skrzydło (ed.), Kon-
stytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Lex 2013, Nr 428294.
52  Ibidem.
53  L. Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2008, p. 89 i n. 
54  P. Hofmański, Prawo do  wolności i  bezpieczeństwa osobistego, [in:] Szkoła praw człowieka. Teksty 
wykładów, Warszawa 1996, p. 185.
ROCZNIKI ADMINISTRACJI I PRAWA.  ROK XVII58
in the aspect of his conduct (not deprivation or restriction of liberty), for example, 
within the scope of making decisions relating to person’s health, which is demon-
strated in the autonomy of a person and, consequently, autonomy of a patient, as well 
as conscience, or religion. 
On the other hand, B. Banaszak points out that within the constitutional con-
cept of human liberty it  is primarily a matter of ensuring the protection of ability 
of controlling oneself at any place and at any time and, thus, it is essentially about the 
personal liberty of the subject55. 
1.4. CONFLICT OF PATERNALISM WITH PATIENT AUTONOMY
Patient’s autonomy is a  fundamental principle of modern bioethics and medi-
cine56. In terms of its general definition, it is based on the assumption that a patient 
who is aware of his or her own condition and capable of making decisions should 
make that decision on his or her own, without any involvement of third parties, in ac-
cordance with his or her own convictions57. 
However, the relationship patient-physician was not always based on  the cur-
rently accepted principle of patient’s autonomy, since there was another one in place 
that used to be followed for many years – the principle of paternalism based on the 
attitude of the father who showed concern about the well-being of his family, espe-
cially children under his care who were unable to express their will, while refusing 
to take into account their views in a particular matter58. The paternalistic theory ap-
plied to adults capable of understanding and expressing their conscious will leads 
to negative perception and understanding of the theory, whereas applied to patient 
is an indication of authoritarian attitude of the physician towards the patient whose 
life is  in danger59. The existence of  moderate and radical paternalism is  indicated 
in the field of bioethical science in the relationship physician-patient60. 
Talking about a moderate paternalism, it is permissible to object against a harm-
ful act directed towards the patient, but only if  it is absolutely non-voluntary or  if 
a  short-term intervention is  necessary in  order to  determine whether it  is volun-
tary or not61. It  is accepted in  situations where a patient suffered as  a  result of  an 
accident or is suffering from mental illness, and his or her actions do not show the 
characteristics of voluntariness or, even more, are directed against his or her own life 
55  B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, p. 175.
56  M. Nowacka, Filozoficzne…, p. 326.
57  Ibidem. 
58  T. Biesaga, Autonomia lekarza i pacjenta a cel medycyny, „Medycyna Praktyczna” 2005, No. 6, p. 20. 
59  Ibidem. 
60  J. Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, Can J. Philos 1971, p. 105-125; D.C. Thomasma, Beyond medical pa-
ternalism ant patient autonomy: a model of physician conscience for the physician – patient relationship, 
Ann. Intern. Med. 1983, No. 98, p. 243-248.
61  J. Feinberg, Legal…, p. 133.
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or health62. On the other hand, the radical paternalism is based on the consent to pre-
vent a harmful act of a patient, even if there is an assumption that it is undertaken 
independently63. 
As argued by T. Biesaga, on the one hand a disapprobation towards authoritarian 
attitude in medicine emphasized the role of a patient and at the same time evoked the 
principle of dignity and liberty of a human (including a patient), and on the other, the 
perception of patient autonomy did not fully yield the expected effects64. The polem-
ic between paternalism and autonomy eventually came down to a conflict between 
an egocentric liberty of the physician and a particularism of the patient65. It is debat-
ed, however, that a specific part of paternalism in the physician-patient relationship 
seems to be justified and the dispute is primarily based on its scope and the degree 
of its application66. Considering such an issue, the following question arises – in what 
situations is  the principle of  paternalism allowed to  be used? It  seems reasonable 
to refer to the purpose of medicine and, consequently, to the benefit of a patient and 
its application to the greatest extent as well as the benevolent act of medical personnel 
towards the patient. It is often the case that patient’s approbation of physician’s pater-
nalistic behaviour results from his willingness to take responsibility for himself and 
the consequences of his decision that may not always be beneficial for the patient. 
On the other hand, this leads to a violation of liberty and dignity of the patient67. It is, 
therefore, extremely important to integrate a specialist knowledge of a physician and 
a professional nature of his or her actions intended to protect health and life of a hu-
man being while respecting and ensuring the principle of patient’s autonomy, who 
in the vast majority of cases, does not have a necessary knowledge to make a fully 
sovereign decision regarding further medical proceedings in his case68. The physician 
is obliged to respect autonomy of the patient, which is not so much a result of a moral 
obligation, but rather a respect for the patient’s well-being69. It should be emphasized 
that in  such respect with regards to autonomy the responsibility is not greater for 
the physician, since autonomy is  supplemented by  responsibility of  the patient70. 
A duty of a physician is primarily based on informing the patient about possible con-
sequences, both positive and negative, of a specific action undertaken by a medical 
staff to which the patient eventually agrees or refuses to agree after considering all 
the circumstances.
62  T. Biesaga, Autonomia…, p. 20.
63  E.D. Pellegrino, D.C. Thomasma, For the patien’s good: the restoration of beneficience in health care, 
“Oxford University”, New York 1988, p. 49. 
64  T. Biesaga, Autonomia…, p. 21.
65  Ibidem. 
66  R. Gillon, Etyka lekarska – Problemy filozoficzne, Warszawa 1978, p. 78-83.
67  M. Nowacka, Filozoficzne…, p. 326. 
68  Ibidem. 
69  Ibidem, p. 327.
70  Ibidem. 
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Furthermore, as pointed out by E.D. Pellegrino, “The patient’s right to reject un-
wanted forms of treatment has been neglected for too long (...) Moreover, the un-
expected development of medicine has made the choice of treatment fundamental, 
as compared to any previous possibilities. The principle of patient‘s autonomy has 
been recognized as protection against the misappropriation of his or her right to par-
ticipate in decisions concerning his or her life”71. Referring to Locke’s ownership right 
of  a  person, the physician does not have any authority to  make decisions for the 
patient, and the patient is not entitled to accept the paternalistic attitude of the physi-
cian72. However, it is necessary in any case to behave in accordance with Aristoteles’ 
theory of the golden measure, which was aptly stated by T. Brzeziński, who argued 
that: “Paternalism, although often legally incapacitated for the patient, was a  rela-
tionship based on a responsibility for the patient’s fate and on empathy so it agreed 
with what we understand as humanitarianism. A relationship solely based on writ-
ten rights and obligations becomes a  formal relationship where the physician will 
be more eager to follow the law, rather than consider the consequences of such a pro-
cedure. Apart from introduction of  a  more sophisticated technique into medicine 
alongside the increasingly narrow specialization of physicians, this is another step 
that, if improperly used, might cause further dehumanization of medicine”73.
2. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF A PATIENT
 In light of the above considerations, the word patient is very important. It comes 
from the Latin language, precisely, from the expression “patient”, which means “suf-
ferer”, “sick”74. Sometimes it is also linked to the English word “patient” or “showing 
patience”. As J. Bujny points out, referring to the Polish dictionary in which the word 
“patient” is understood as “a sick person referring to a physician for medical advice, 
being under physician’s care”75, or a Polish foreign word dictionary indicating that the 
patient is “a sick person looking for medical advice from a physician, being under phy-
sician’s care”76 stresses that in referring to the above definitions of the word “patient”, 
both terms, “patient” and “sick person” can be used interchangeably77. Nevertheless, the 
definition of a “patient” specified by World Health Organization indicates that a patient 
is anyone taking advantage of medical service, regardless of whether he or she is healthy 
71  E.D. Pellegrino, The Philosophy of  Medicine Reborn. A. Pellegrino Reader, [in:] H.T. Engelhardt, 
F. Jotterand (ed.), Patient and Physician Autonomy. Conflicting Rughts and Obligations in the Physician – 
Patient Relationship, Notre Dame 2008, p. 207. 
72  M. Nowacka, Filozoficzne…, p. 329. 
73  T. Brzeziński, Etyka lekarska, Warszawa 2002, p. 61.
74  J. Bujny, Prawa pacjenta. Między autonomią a paternalizmem, Warszawa 2007, p. 9, Słownik wyrazów 
obcych PWN, Warszawa 1999, p. 809.
75  E. Sobol, Mały słownik języka polskiego, Warszawa 1995, p. 591. 
76  E. Sobol, Słownik wyrazów obcych, Warszawa 1995, p. 809. 
77  J. Bujny, Prawa…, s. 9. 
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or sick. On the other hand, a physician has a duty to examine a patient, make a diag-
nosis and implement the appropriate treatment based on his/her medical knowledge78. 
Thus, a dictionary definition of a patient is much broader than the definition of a sick 
person, because he/she may not be suffering from any disease symptoms (as the pa-
tient may be  referring to a physician only for a  consultation, preparing for a  trans-
plant, which requires the patient to be fully healthy at the time of surgery79, or it could 
be a woman giving birth80)81. The way in which the concept of a patient is understood 
is also related to the act 2 rule. 1 point 10 of the law of 15 April 2011 on the medical ac-
tivity82, in which the health benefit was determined. According to the regulation above, 
the benefit should be understood as actions to preserve, restore or  improve person’s 
health, and any other medical activities resulting from the healing process or separate 
laws regulating the way of their implementation, so in accordance with the literal sense, 
these are not the only actions undertaken while dealing with sick person. The health 
care services act of 30 August 199183, contained a range of exemplary health care ser-
vices, which included, among others, medical examination and counseling, treatment, 
care for a healthy child, diagnostic tests (including medical analysis), and even vaccina-
tion. However, this act was derogated in January 2011. 
It should also be noted that in the Polish legal system until 2007 there was no legal 
definition of the concept of patient. An attempt to unify the understanding of it was 
in the draft law of 2008 on the protection of individual and collective rights of a pa-
tient and the Patient Rights Ombudsman, which was to become part of laws governing 
health protection84, based on act 3 point 2, a patient was defined as a person receiving 
the health benefits from the benefits provider. However, the legal definition of a pa-
tient may be used for marketing purposes only recently, based on act on  the rights 
of a patient and the Patient Rights Ombudsman as of November 6, 200885, where in act. 
78  E. Syweńki, D. Suchańska, D. Dobrowolska, R. Góralewicz-Lenartowicz, L. Baran, M. Berghausen-
-Mazur, Płód jako pacjent – rys historyczny, „Perinatologia, Neonatologia i Ginekologia”, tom 1, zeszyt 4, 
p. 314-318, 2008, s. 314, http://www.ptmp.com.pl/png/png1z4_2008/pngz14-12.pdf [access: 20.03.2017]. 
79  D. Ponczek, Prawa pacjenta w Polsce, Łódź 1999, p. 7. 
80  M. Boratyńska, P. Konieczniak, Prawa pacjenta, Warszawa 2001, p. 12-13. 
81  K. Wojtczak indicates that the understanding of the concept of „patient” should be considered on the 
basis of the notion of „health” as a defined human condition, which indicates complete prosperity both 
physically and psychologically and socially, while stressing that this is not simply a matter of no illness 
or also flawed (K. Wojtczak, Rozważania nad pojęciem pacjenta, [w:] J. Filipek (ed.), Jednostka w de-
mokratycznym państwie prawa, Bielsko-Biała 2003, p. 744-750). These considerations are largely based 
on the health issue identified by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a state of well-being at the 
physical, psychological and social level, and therefore not only a condition associated only with the ab-
sence of illness or also inadequate (Konstytucja Światowej Organizacji Zdrowia (WHO) z 22 lipca 1946 
roku, Dz.U. 1948, nr 61, poz. 477, ze zm.). 
82  Ustawa z dnia 15 kwietnia 2011 roku o działalności leczniczej (Dz.U. 2016.2260).
83  Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1991 roku o zakładach opieki zdrowotnej (Dz.U. 2011, nr 45, poz. 235). 
84  Projekt ustawy z 2008 roku o ochronie indywidualnych i zbiorowych praw pacjenta oraz Rzeczniku 
Praw Pacjenta, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc6.nsf/projekty/283_p.htm [access: 20.03.2017]. 
85  Ustawa z dnia 6 listopada 2008 roku o prawach pacjenta i Rzeczniku Praw Pacjenta (tekst jedn. Dz.U. 
z 2016 r., poz. 1070).
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3 point 4, the legislator defined a patient as a person applying for health care or health 
services to their provider or a person performing medical profession. 
2.1. A PATIENT UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF PENITENTIAL ISOLATION
On the basis of the above considerations, the question arises as to whether a per-
son staying in a detention center can also be perceived as a patient. Undoubtedly, 
a person staying in a penitentiary unit is in a unique life situation, just because of the 
mere fact of  deprivation of  liberty, and consequently numerous other limitations. 
Based on that fact, it is important to ask a question whether more important is the 
execution of the sentence imposed on the imprisoned person, or whether the prior-
ity in this case has the imprisoner’s health protection. Undoubtedly, the overriding 
priority is the life and health of the person, subject to constitutional guarantees, and 
consequently personal rights in the form of the right to life and health. Unfortunately, 
based on practice, a person who is deprived of liberty is mainly considered, especially 
by prison officers, primarily as a convict, then as a patient. 
In the Polish legal system, prison health system guarantees to persons deprived 
of their liberty a health care under the provisions of act 102 rule 1 of the law of 6 June 
1997 of  Penal Code (hereinafter referred to  as the “Criminal Code”)86, which se-
cures the right to medical treatment for prisoners. According to act 115 rule 1 and 
3 of Criminal Code, prisoners are provided with free health services, medicines and 
sanitary items87. The legislator did not specify on the ground of the Criminal Code, 
the interpretation of medical benefits, so it seems justified to understand them as in-
dicated above, based on  the law of  medical activities. In  addition, under the act, 
health services for persons deprived of their liberty are provided primarily by treat-
ment providers that specialize in those services (Act 115 § 4 and 5 of the Criminal 
Code) – therefore, prisoners should be guaranteed with an access to health services 
in penitentiary, only if necessary, outside of this institution. Health services are pro-
vided to convicts in facilities forming part of  the organizational structure of peni-
tentiary units (outpatient clinics, patients’ chambers, prison hospitals, diagnostic 
laboratories, dentist, rehabilitation and physiotherapy clinics)88. In addition, the im-
prisoned person is entitled to select a treatment from a doctor’s of his/her choice and 
to the use of any additional medicines and medical products, but only in particular 
cases and only with the consent of the director of the penitentiary after consultation 
with the prison doctor (act 115 § 6 of the Criminal Code). At the same time it should 
86  Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny wykonawczy (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2016 r., poz. 1948).
87  Convicts are not covered by health insurance, art. 66 ustawy z dnia 27 sierpnia 2004 roku o świadcze-
niach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2016 r., poz. 960). 
88  D. Rogala, A. Banach, D. Jachimowicz-Gaweł, Ż. Skinder, System opieki zdrowotnej nad osobami osa-
dzonymi w zakładach penitencjarnych w Polsce, „Hygeia Public Health” 2013, No. 48 (4), p. 442, http://
www.h-ph.pl/pdf/hyg-2013/hyg-2013-4-441.pdf [access: 20.03.2017].
MAGDALENA SOBAS, IMPLEMENTATION OF PATIENT AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE... 63
be stressed that medical care for persons deprived of their liberty is free of charge, 
the funding comes from the state budget. In addition, medical staff working in the 
penitentiary unit is obliged to guarantee to prisoners who are under ambulatory care 
a 24-hour medical supervision. It needs to be highlighted that hospitals in the or-
ganizational structure of a penitentiary unit are excluded from the possibility of per-
forming specialized procedures due to lack of appropriate medical equipment (refers 
mainly to cardiology, ophthalmology, neurosurgery or transplantology).
Based on the discussion above, whether a person staying at a detention centre 
should be identified with the patient in the indicated sense, the answer seems obvi-
ous and brings us  to a very accurate definition of a patient by K. Wojtczak where 
the concept of a patient consists of three elements to gain full understanding of it89. 
The first basic one, is that the above concept is only associated with a human being, 
individual, a physical person90. The second element refers to a natural person whose 
health care is provided by the entitled person regardless of the person’s entitled to re-
ceive it, or whether he or she is  still waiting to  receive such benefit91. Thirdly, the 
concept of a patient as a person relates to an individual who has a specific bond with 
a member of medical staff or particular unit, because he or she is receiving health care 
services or is expecting to receive them92. Going further, not taking into account any 
moral or ethical values or any social issues in relation to people who were convicted, 
and consequently they have been placed in a place of detention, moreover they are 
in need for health care, it is important to point out that in each case they completely 
and unequivocally fulfil the criteria to recognize them as patients, because of the ba-
sic principles of humanitarianism. 
3. AUTONOMY OF OBJECTS IN DETENTION CENTRES 
AND ITS POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS 
Despite the commonly accepted principle of patient autonomy, which is applied 
regardless of the patient’s condition, there is a possibility of emphasizing its limita-
tions that result from either legal aspects, or aspects without normative qualities. 
Bioethics indicate that an extremely frequent limitation of patient autonomy are 
situations when the patient’s ability to make decisions on his or her own is restricted, 
in case it would lead to harmful effects on health and, above all, it would pose a threat 
to health conditions of the public, third parties, innocent, or simply would involve hav-
ing to make substantial financial outlays93. This is a reference to the philosophy of au-
89  K. Wojtczak, Rozważania…, p. 750. 
90  Ibidem. 
91  Ibidem.
92  Ibidem. 
93  T.L. Beauchamp, J.F. Childress, Zasady…, p. 137. 
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tonomy determined by J.S. Mill, articulated by the fact that the limit of autonomy is es-
tablished “externally”94. 
A generally accepted principle is also related to a rule associated with a consent 
of the patient (or another authorized entity) to receive therapeutic treatment (medical 
treatment), but this is an issue of such an extensive scope that it will only be mentioned 
in this document. This matter is specified in detail by the provisions of act 31 and the 
subsequent Act of 5 December 1996 on the professions of doctor and dentist95, as well 
as by the Act 5 of 6 November 2008 on the Patient Rights Act and Patient Rights Om-
budsman. This prerogative was also a  subject to  sanctions specified in  the art. 192 
of June 6, 1997 Criminal Code, which established fines, restriction of liberty or dep-
rivation of liberty for up to 2 years in case of performing a medical treatment without 
consent of the patient96. The implementation of such an operation also gives rise to civil 
damages97 and constitutes a violation of the Medical Code of Ethics, specifically act 1598 
and, consequently, under the Act of 2 December 2009 on medical centres the physician 
may also be professionally liable99.
However, with regard to people deprived of their liberty the principle of patient 
autonomy suffers from limitations, in particular when referred to a patient undergo-
ing a particular treatment without his or her consent. Such a possibility is provided for 
by Art. 118, among others, which states that in case of an immediate danger threatening 
a life of a sentenced person, there is a possibility of performing a medical (even surgi-
cal) procedure even if the sentenced person objected. However, such a situation must 
be identified by at least two physicians, and then the competent authority able to ap-
prove the procedure is the penitentiary court. This does not apply, however, to emer-
gency cases when the physician may decide to perform a medical intervention. There 
are many arguments in  favour of such a regulation. First of all, it  is argued that the 
detainee, while in detention centre, may be limited to a certain extent in his or her inde-
pendence particularly by other fellow prisoners, which often leads to acts of aggression 
directed at himself or herself in the form of self-harm, including suicides100. At the same 
time, it should be indicated that it  is the responsibility of the Prison Service officers 
to ensure that people sentenced to imprisonment or temporarily detained and those 
94  G. Hołub, Co skrywa zasada…, p. 147. 
95  Ustawa z dnia 5 grudnia 1996 roku o zawodach lekarza i lekarza dentysty (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2017 
r., poz. 125).
96  Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 roku kodeks karny (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2016 r., poz. 437).
97  Ustawa z dnia 23 czerwca 1964 roku kodeks cywilny (tekst jedn. Dz.U. 2016 r., poz. 380).
98  Kodeks Etyki Lekarskiej, http://www.nil.org.pl/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/4764/Kodeks-Etyki-Le-
karskiej.pdf [access: 21.03.2017]. 
99  Ustawa z dnia 2 grudnia 2009 roku o izbach lekarskich (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2016 r., poz. 65). 
100  T. Szymanowski, Z. Świda, Kodeks karny wykonawczy. Komentarz. Ustawy dodatkowe, akty wykonawcze, 
Librata 1998, s. 227; T. Kolarczyk, S. Wrona, Samobójstwa tymczasowo aresztowanych i skazanych, „Przegląd 
Więziennictwa Polskiego” 1977, No. 16-17, p. 47.; in the 80s and 90s of the last century, suicide accounted for 
30.3% of deaths in prisons (J. Malec, Samoagresja osób pozbawionych wolności, [w:] Stan i węzłowe problemy 
polskiego więziennictwa, cz. II, Biuletym Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich, Warszawa 1997, s. 179). 
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who are subject to custodial sentences and coercive measures resulting in deprivation 
of liberty have their rights respected, in particular humanitarian living conditions, dig-
nity, healthcare and tolerance of religion101. 
A particularly large group in terms of detained people are patients who committed 
self-harmful acts, which involves performing an act that leads to a harm to themselves102. 
The category of self-inflicted acts might also include refusing to eat, and it is indicated 
that it is justified to using artificial nutrition in such a situation in order to protect life 
and health of the detainee. First and foremost, the arguments in favour of applying the 
construction of state of higher necessity in such a situation were raised by the literature 
relating to infringement of a legally protected good in order to protect another good 
of a higher social value103. On the other hand, however, one should remember about the 
already mentioned liberty, personal liberty, ability to make decisions about oneself, hu-
man autonomy and patient autonomy. This theory is, however, undermined by the fact 
that in the discussed case both liberty as well as health and life belong to the same and 
not different entities, which would justify the use of the state of higher necessity104. Ex-
ecutive Criminal Code of 1969105 included the possibility of compulsory treatment and, 
consequently, compulsory eating. At that time, competencies of the physician included 
making a decision regarding the necessity of performing specific medical procedures, 
including feeding the patient despite a lack of his or her consent. 
Currently, under the applicable executive criminal code, the legislator did not envis-
age the possibility of using forced treatment of the detainee. The only indication in this 
respect seems to be art. 116 of Executive Criminal Code including the open catalogue 
of obligations of the detainee, in particular the provisions defining the rules and proce-
dures of punishment established in the penal institution of order as well as the execution 
of orders of superiors and other authorized persons. Within the scope of this provision, 
the legislator included only the detainee’s obligation to surrender, irrespective of obliga-
tions set out in  the regulations regarding the elimination of  infectious diseases, vene-
real diseases and tuberculosis, alcoholism and drug addiction – defined by the legisla-
tion medical examination, treatment, medical procedures, sanitation and rehabilitation, 
as well as tests for a presence of alcohol, drugs or psychotropic substances, and the sen-
tenced person who was ordered to have psychological or psychiatric examinations per-
formed by a penitentiary judge is also obliged to provide the investigator with informa-
tion regarding his or her health condition, previous illnesses and injuries, the conditions 
101  Ustawa z dnia 9 kwietnia 2010 roku o Służbie Więziennej (Dz.U. 2016, poz. 1250). 
102  T. Leśniak, W. Szota, Zachowania samoagresyjne jako problem penitencjarno-psychologiczny. Z prak-
tyki wymiaru sprawiedliwości, No. 3, 1983, s. 129, self harm can include for example so-called spriking 
(in eye something objects), dusting (pouring various materials in eyes), incision (cut the veins, tendons) 
or swallowing something
103  A. Zoll, Odpowiedzialnośc karna lekarza za niepowodzenia w leczeniu, Warszawa 1988, p. 18-19; A. Li-
szewska, Problem zgody pacjenta jako dylemat aksjologiczny, „Prawo i Medycyna” 1999, nr 1, p. 85-90. 
104  Ibidem. 
105  Ustawa z dnia 19 kwietnia 1969 roku kodeks karny wykonawczy (Dz.U., 1969, nr 13, poz. 98, ze zm.). 
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under which he or she was educated and the performed activities essential for exami-
nation ordered by a psychiatrist or psychologist. Consecutively, with regard to the food 
intake, the legislature in 2003106 introduced the provision of art. 116a of Executive Crimi-
nal Code stating that the sentenced person must not refuse to eat meals provided by the 
prison administration to enforce a specific decision or conduct, and to cause an injury 
or a health damage to oneself, as well as induce or assist in the conduct of such offenses 
(if the sentenced person commits the acts mentioned above, one is a subject to discipli-
nary action under Article 142 of the Executive Criminal Code). It should be emphasized 
that based on the literal wording of the provision, this prohibition applies only when the 
detainee performs acts specified in the art. 116a item 5 of the Act, where this action is in-
tended to force a particular decision or procedure and does not refer to refusal to accept 
food for another reason. However, as argued by J. Malec, acts of self-aggression, which 
undoubtedly include refusal to accept food, may be dictated by emotional considerations 
linked to one’s situation, separation from family or detrimental judgment for the person 
deprived of liberty made by court, as well as instrumental considerations whose goal is to 
force the administration unit to arrange a transfer to another penitentiary facility or force 
a decision to undergo hospital treatment outside the facility, which undoubtedly makes 
it possible for the detainee to escape 107. However, in the event of the detainee’s attempt 
to starve, a referral to the provision of art. 118 of the Executive Criminal Code and an im-
plementation of a specific procedure based on, among others, an obligation to inform 
a director of the detained centre, the penitentiary judge, at the physician’s request. As the 
Court of Appeal in Cracow stated in its decision dated April 16, 2003, a prison physician, 
whose job it is to assess the health condition of a detainee, does not need to be a specialist 
since his or her obligation is not to diagnose or prescribe treatment, but rather to make 
a judgment whether there is a threat to health or life of the sentenced person, in case of his 
or her further treatment in the penitentiary facility108. 
It should be mentioned that there is a possibility to oblige the prisoner to go to detox-
ification or therapeutic treatment, which combines with rehabilitation efforts and a possi-
bility of assessing the offender. The assessment is based on a positive forensic criminologi-
cal opinion build on the assumption that his or her current posture and behaviour after 
committing an offense indicate high probability of compliance with the established legal 
order in the longer term109. The legislator provided for such a possibility in act 72 § 1 of the 
Criminal Code, according to which a court may oblige a convicted person to, among 
106  Novel: Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 2003 roku o zmianie ustawy kodeks karny wykonawczy oraz niektó-
rych innych ustaw z dniem 1 września 2003 roku (Dz.U. z 2003 r., nr 142, poz. 1380). 
107  J. Malec, Samoagresja…, p. 212-213. 
108  Postanowienie Sądu Apelacyjnego w  Krakowie z  dnia 16  kwietnia 2003 roku, sygn. akt II  Akz 
121/03, „Krakowskie Zeszyty Sądowe” 2003, No. 5, p. 54. 
109  O. Kąsowska, Możliwości zobowiązania skazanego do podjęcia leczenia odwykowego, terapeutycznego, 
oddziaływań korekcyjno-edukacyjnych. Metody prowadzenia terapii, programów korekcyjno-edukacyjnych, 
profilaktycznych, http://www.ms.gov.pl/probacja/2014/download,2718,10.html [access: 2.02.2017]. 
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other things, undergo treatment, particularly rehabilitation, or a therapy, and to partici-
pate in rehabilitating and educational programs. However, in the indicated cases the im-
position of these obligations requires consent of the convict, which does not constitute 
a restriction of autonomy and is therefore not the subject of this study. 
SUMMARY
In the light of the above considerations, the principle of will’s autonomy against 
the idea of paternalism is the core of modern medicine. However, it should be borne 
in mind that this rule is not absolute. The paternalism of a physician, who rejects 
to respect patient’s will, in any case is in accordance with the ethical and moral princi-
ples of the profession. The autonomy of a patient should be analysed in terms of both, 
the state of a patient and the relation to the physician and his medical knowledge. 
It should not only include his free will and the ability to decide on his or her own 
destiny, but also the responsibility for the decisions made; on the other hand, one 
must not forget about the proper understanding of the autonomy of a physician and 
his actions where a primary concern and highest value is a wellbeing of a patient. 
Autonomy as a  fundamental principle of patient’s rights, as mentioned previously, 
is not unrestricted. It should be emphasized, that insofar as the legislator gives a pos-
sibility of initiating treatment without a consent of a patient to perform certain activi-
ties or medical treatment, the institution should not be abused. There should be an 
unconditional objection to any categorization of patients, irrespective of the cause, 
and particularly in relation to patients in detention centres. The principle of equal 
treatment is determined not only by statutory norms, but above all by the Constitu-
tion, which guarantees the respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the in-
dividual, regardless of the situation. It is crucial that in each case both physician and 
other medical staff are guided primarily by the principle of humanity, demonstrating 
empathy and understanding to the patient irrespective of his or her situation or past 
actions. Accordingly, it should be stressed that the patient’s autonomy is limited, but 
these restrictions are only admissible in material, but never in subjective aspect.
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Postanowienie Sądu Apelacyjnego w Krakowie z dnia 16 kwietnia 2003 roku, sygn. akt II Akz 
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Summary: This paper deals with issues related to  the principle of  human autonomy, and 
thus the autonomy of the patient’s will. It takes into consideration the origins of the above 
principle both in the US and Polish law, taking into account bioethical issues. It also points 
to the relation of autonomy to paternalism. Simultaneously, it attempts to identify the actual 
implementation of  the principle of autonomy of a patient staying at a penitentiary and its 
possible limitations.
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REALIZACJA ZASADY AUTONOMII PACJENTA 
W WARUNKACH IZOLACJI PENITENCJARNEJ
Streszczenie: Niniejsze opracowanie podejmuje tematykę związaną z  zasadą autonomii 
człowieka i co się z tym wiąże – autonomii woli pacjenta. Podejmuje rozważania dotyczące 
genezy zasady autonomii zarówno na gruncie prawa amerykańskiego, jak i polskiego, a także 
w odniesieniu do kwestii bioetycznych. Wskazuje również na relację autonomii w stosunku 
do paternalizmu. Tekst ten jednocześnie podejmuje próbę wskazania faktycznej realizacji zas-
ady autonomii pacjenta przebywającego w miejscu detencji oraz jej ewentualne ograniczenia. 
Słowa kluczowe: autonomia, wolność, osadzony, prawa człowieka, pacjent, paternalizm 
